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This paper follows up recent work on the relationship between (un–)employment
and wage effects of social security financing undertaken by the OECD Jobs Study.
Based on a simple macroeconometric model of the labour market, I investigate
whether the peculiar OECD results for Germany on the incidence of social security
contributions and taxes also hold up within a somewhat different model. The study
also provides some policy simulations to answer the topical question whether
increasing indirect taxes to finance a reduction of the contribution rates to social
security levied on employees and employers in Germany. The main result of the
paper is that there is in fact a positive short–run employment effect of a revenue
neutral switch of financing social security expenditures by increasing indirect taxes
and reducing employers' contribution rates, but in the longer–term only modest
effects remain due to higher wages.
JEL classification: E24, H55, J381
1 Introduction
The German social welfare state is under pressure from high taxes and social
security contributions and, related to these, high unemployment.  Recently, the
united German unemployment rate has hit an all–time high, and there is little hope
for a significant improvement in the near future.  At the same time, the government
aims to reduce the budget deficit, while the public faces ever increasing social
security contribution rates which, due to demographic factors, are bound to increase
even faster in the future.  Reducing the already quite high contribution rates to
social security financing is seen both as a short–term policy to reduce
unemployment and a long–term strategy to secure the solvency of the social
security system.  Furthermore, on equity grounds, it is increasingly seen as
necessary to reduce the share of general welfare transfers which are financed from
social security contribution.  It therefore comes as no surprise that a strategy to
reduce the high contribution rates to social security meets with broad approval both
in the policy arena and in the economics profession.  As to the financing of these
cuts, there is less agreement, although the idea to increase indirect taxes to
compensate for reductions in social security contribution rates seems to have
become more popular recently.
Germany, of course, is not the only country in Europe with both a dismal
unemployment record and looming financing problems of the social security
system. Both within the Commission of the European Union and the OECD the
relationship between unemployment and taxes as well as social security financing
has been on the agenda for some time.  This topic has also featured prominently in
the OECD Jobs Study, the White Book on Growth, Competition and Employment,
and the 1995 Employment in Europe report by the Commission of the European
Union.  Although there seems to be widespread agreement on the potential to
reduce labour costs and increase employment by shifting part of the financing of
social security contributions to indirect taxes, the empirical support for such a
policy is less than conclusive, to say the least.  The most ambitious study on the
relationship between employment and wage effects of social security financing has
been undertaken as part of the OECD Jobs Study [OECD (1994)] for several
member states.  For Germany this study comes up with some surprising findings.  In
particular, it is estimated that increases in both employers' and employees' social
security contributions, the income tax as well as indirect taxes lead to proportionate
increases in real labour costs in the long–run, although there are some important
differences in the short–run.  As implied by the structure of the underlying model of
the labour market, at least in the long–run the employment effects of shifting the
burden of financing the social security system from contribution rates to direct or
indirect taxation may be rather modest.
Following up the analysis on which the results in the OECD Jobs Study are based,
this paper provides an empirical analysis of the West German development. In2
particular, I will investigate whether the peculiar OECD results for Germany on the
incidence of social security contributions and taxes also hold up within a different
econometric specification and for an extended observation period. Based on a
simple macroeconometric model of the labour market the study also provides policy
simulations to answer the topical question whether increasing indirect taxes to
finance a reduction of the contribution rates to social security levied on employees
and employers in Germany. The main result of the paper is that there is in fact a
substantial positive short–run employment effect of a revenue neutral switch of
financing social security expenditures by increasing indirect taxes and reducing
employers' contribution rates, but in the longer–term only a modest effect remains
as a result of subsequent price and wage increases.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I will briefly
summarize related existing research, in particular for Germany. The econometric
model is described in section 3.  Estimation results are presented and discussed in
section 4.  Section 5 contains some policy simulations with the model, and section 6
concludes.
2 Previous Related Studies
There are very few empirical studies which explicitely take into account the effects
of social security contributions and taxes or try to separate these effects on
aggregate employment and wages. Some descriptive evidence for the member states
of the European Union has recently been compiled by the Commission (1994,
Chapter 6; 1995, Part III, Section 1).  The conclusion of these comparative analyses
is that the relationship between the level of social security contributions and labour
costs is rather weak, as is the relationship between the former and changes in
employment or unemployment. The Commission also concludes from the presented
descriptive evidence that employers' social security contributions are to a large
extent shifted on to labour in the long–run, although some positive effects from
reducing social security contributions are seen in the short–run.
In the OECD Jobs Study (OECD, 1994) potential unemployment effects of taxes
and social security contributions are analysed in various ways.  At its simplest,
unemployment rates are correlated with the so–called tax wedge for a group of 12
countries.  The tax wedge is the difference of labour costs (inclusive of employers'
social security contributions) and the net wage after deduction of indirect taxes and
employees' social security contributions.  Holding taxes constant, the tax wedge is
increasing in social security contributions.  There seems to be no significant
correlation between the tax wedge, labour costs and (un–)employment.  The study
also finds a negative correlation between employers' social security contributions
and the employees' share in value added in the private sector of the sample of
countries observed, which might be interpreted as backward shifting of employers'
social security contributions on wages.  However, the negative correlation does not3
hold up when changes rather than levels of these variables are analysed.  Hence, at
that level of analysis, no robust relationships can be observed.
Most of the econometric studies for various OECD countries are based on time
series data either for the national economy or its private sector and relating wages
and/or (un–)employment to the tax wedge and some other explanatory variables.
Since these studies are summarized in OECD (1994) and Bean (1994), this will not
be repeated here, except for Germany.  Suffice it to note here that most studies do
suggest that a higher tax wedge leads to higher labour costs and less employment.
In particular, for Germany no statistically significant effects of the tax wedge on
wages or unemployment were discernable (c.f. Bean, Layard and Nickell, 1986;
Turner, Richardson and Rauffet, 1993).  Missing from the summary in the OECD
Jobs Study are at least the following recent German studies which include some
measure of the tax wedge. Within a macroeconometric disequilibrium model of the
Geman labour market, Entorf, König and Pohlmeier (1992) find a strong positive
employment effect of a reduction of employers' social security contributions.  Franz
and Gordon (1993) include changes in the tax wedge as explanatory variable in
their wage regressions and find a strong positive effect for the period 1973 to 1990,
but no statistically significant effect when the observation period is extended back
to 1960.  In their analysis of the determination of contract wages in West Germany,
Carruth and Schnabel (1993) find that the tax wedge only affects wages in the
short–run, but has no effect on the long–run equilibrium relationship. Hence, in the
long–run changes in the tax wedge seem to be entirely borne by labour, according
to this study.  By implication, there should also be no long–term wage effects on
employment.
The most ambitious study on the employment and wage effects of social security
financing and taxes in a comparative context is summarized in OECD (1994), which
is based on econometric work by Tyrväinen (1995a, b) briefly discussed below.
The study reports important differences in the adjustment of real labour costs to
changes in both employers' and employees' social security contributions as well as
direct and indirect taxes (see Table 1).4









Germany 1.0 1.0 1.0
Canada 0.8 0.8 0.8
Japan 0.5 0.5 0.5
Finland 0.5 0.5 0.5
Australia 0.5 0.5 0.5
France 0.4 0.4 0.4
Italy 0.4 0.4 0.4
Sweden 0.0 1.0 0.0
United States 0.0 0.0 1.0
United Kingdom 0.25 0.25 0.25
Note: For the interpretation of the numbers see text below.
Source: OECD (1995, Table 9.5, p. 246).
The table shows that (West) Germany obtains a special position in the league of
countries analysed. In Germany, an increase of, respectively, employers' as well as
employees' social security contributions, the income tax or indirect taxes by 1
percentage point leads to an increase in real labour costs (real gross wages plus
employers' social security contributions) by 1 percent in the long–run.
1  This
implies that "wages do not fall in order to offset increases in employers' social
security contributions and in the long run employees fully offset increases in
indirect and direct taxes through wage demands" (OECD, 1994, p. 246).
This is not only an astonishing result in its own right, but gains even greater weight
in light of the results for the other countries included in the study.  In particular, it is
to be expected that employees are the more likely to differentiate between taxes
proper and social security contributions the stronger the social security system is
related to previous (lifetime) earnings.  In fact, the German social security system is
built on this principle, at least with respect to its public pension and unemployment
benefit parts.  This insurance principle probably plays a greater role in Germany
                                          
1 Note that the interpretations of the numbers in the table as "elasticities" given by OECD (1994,
p. 246) and Tyrväinen (1995a, Table 2) differs from my interpretation given in the text.  If the
numbers were in fact elasticities in the usual sense, an increase of, say, the income tax rate, t, by
one percentage point would increase real labour costs by 1/t percent. Given a mean value of t of
about 0.15 in the observation period this would imply an incredibly large effect.5
than in most other countries included in the OECD study.  Nevertheless, the study's
estimates for Germany imply that employers have to bear completely the social
security contributions formally levied on them in the long run, while employees are
able to shift increases in social security contributions and taxes on to higher real
wages.
Since labour demand negatively depends on real labour costs, as was also confirmed
for Germany by Tyrväinen (1995a), this would imply negative employment effects
and, given the strong increases in social security contributions and taxes over the
last decades, would account for a substantial share of the high level of (West)
German unemployment.  On the other hand, there would be little room for cutting
unemployment by revenue neutral shifts from contribution rates to tax rates.  It is
therefore not only of academic interest but has also important policy implications
whether these results are robust to different model specifications and the use of
other data sets.  The following analysis will provide some supporting, but also some
contradictory evidence for the mentioned results for Germany.
3 Econometric Model
To quantify the aggregate employment and wage effects of social security financing
an econometric model is needed. In the basic specification of the econometric
model, here I follow the approach in the OECD Jobs Study, which is based on the
work by Tyrväinen (1995a, b).  His model consists of a wage and a labour demand
equation and an unemployment identity (the labour force is given).  The main
differences in specification between the equations Tyrväinen (1995a) estimates for
(West) Germany and the present study lie in certain restrictions on the explanatory
variables in the two equations, in particular the way the contribution rates to social
security levied on employers and employees and taxes enter the model.  As to data
sources, I use yearly data from the national income accounts and information on
social security contributions and taxes also supplied by the German Central
Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) for the period 1960 to 1994.  In
contrast, the study by Tyrväinen (1995a) for Germany is based on semi–annual data
covering the period 1972 to 1991 from the OECD macro data base and secondary
data on social security contribution rates and income tax from OECD calculations
on the "Tax/Benefit Position on an Average Production Worker".  The two studies
also differ in that I use contract wages instead of effective wages and salaries since
this better corresponds to the idea of an underlying bargaining model.
2 A
description of variables and references to data sources is contained in the appendix.
                                          
2  However, since the correlation between contract and effective wages is extremely high, there
would be little difference in using the latter instead of the former.6
3.1  Specification of Wage and Employment Equations
3.1.1 Wage  Equation
The long–run wage equation estimated by Tyrväinen (1995a, b) and also in this
study can be derived from a number of bargaining models, such as the monopoly
union or the right–to–manage model (for summaries of these models see, e.g.,
Pencavel, 1985; Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991, Chapter 2). Within the system
of German industrial relations the so–called right–to–manage model (Nickell and
Andrews, 1983) perhaps provides the most plausible description of wage
determination at the aggregate level.  In this model, the union and the firm (or the
employers' organization at the aggregate level) bargain over real wages where the
union takes into account that there exists a well defined trade–off between wages
and employment given by a negatively sloped labour demand schedule.  The
outcome of such bargains, i.e. the combinations of real wages and employment
levels, will depend on the technology, union's (respectively its members') relative
preferences for wages and employment, and the union's and employers' bargaining
strength measured by the value of some fall–back option in case no bargain is
struck. For these latter variables, which distinguish this model from other
bargaining hypotheses, no adequate proxies which could be included in an
aggregate wage equation seem available.
3  In contrast, the effect of technology, i.e.
the labour demand constraint, on real wages can be proxied by labour productivity,
whereas the effects of social security contributions and taxes enter the wage
equation since they affect the union's (or its members') preferences.  Since the focus
of the analysis is on these latter variables, some comments on the way they are
included in the wage equation seems appropriate here.
In principle, direct and indirect taxes as well as employees' and employers'
contribution rates to social security could have different weights in the union's
utility function, and all of them should therefore be included in the wage equation
as separate explanatory variables.  However, due to severe multicollinearity
problems between these variables, this has turned out to be empirically infeasible.
Figure 1 shows that employers' and employees' social security contribution rates
have moved closely together within the observation period due to the principle that
the overall rate is formally split equally between employers and employees.  In
contrast, the ratio of direct taxes to wages and salaries has increased much more
than either contribution rate in the first half of the observation period, and has also
                                          
3  In theoretical models, the value of the union's fall–back option is usually set equal to the level
of unemployment benefits, whereas the employers' fall–back option is equated to the fixed costs
of production.  For practical applications to the German situation these values are obviously
unrealistic. Since empirically credible proxies for these fall–back options are not available at the
aggregate level no particular hypotheses about union behaviour will be tested here.  In fact, for
the purpose at hand, identification of structural parameters of the union's objective function is
also not required.7
shown more variability in the second half which experienced some noticeable tax
reforms.









60 65 70 75 80 85 90
Income Tax Employers' Contributions Employees' Contributions 
Note:  The contribution rates to social security and the direct tax rate are calculated as ratios of
total contributions to gross wages and salaries. Employers' contributions also include
hypothetical contributions in the public sector.
Source: see data appendix
Given this strong multicollinearity between employers' and employees' contribution
rates to social security, it seems infeasible to include both contribution rates as
explanatory variables in the wage equation.  Using data on contribution rates
derived for a "representative" production worker, Tyrväinen (1995a) directly
includes the employers' contribution rate and the sum of the direct tax rate and the
employees' contribution rate to social security in his wage equation.  Given the
variability in the income tax rate, this could perhaps have mitigated the collinearity
between the employers' and employees' contribution rates in my data, too.  I have
therefore tested this possibility using the estimated wage equation reported below.
The result is that the effect of the employers contribution rate could not be
determined with any precision (the estimated coefficient had a standard error three
times the value of the estimate).  Hence, it doesn't seem feasible to separately
estimate the direct effects of the employers' and employees' contribution rates in the
wage equation without imposing some identifying restriction.8
There are two extreme cases to consider:  First, the union doesn't put any positive
value on the employers' contribution rate; second, it enters the union's utility
function in opposite sign and the same absolute value as employees' contribution
rates.  The latter value could either be zero, in case the union considers the
contribution rate as an actuarially fair insurance payment or perhaps as high as the
negative value put on (direct) taxes.  Of course, the (dis–)utility of contribution
rates could also be some weighted average of these upper and lower bounds, but
lacking additional information this cannot be inferred from the data.  As to the
evaluation of employers' social security contributions by the unions, their "official"
position seems to be that employers have to bear their "adequate" share of financing
social security, which traditionally has meant formally splitting contribution rates
equally.
Given that some restrictions on the way taxes and contribution rates enter the wage
equation have to be imposed and taking into account the described instituional
setting, I will assume that the employers' contribution rate do not directly affect
unions' wage setting behaviour, but may affect wages indirectly through labour
demand and, hence, employment as one component of labour productivity. As an
alternative to this specification, I have restricted the long–run effect of the
employers' contribution rate on wages to the same absolute value as that of the
employees' contribution rate, but this restriction turned out not to be data admissible
(see below). I tried to test for differences in wage effects between the income tax
and the employees' contribution rate by including these variables separately in the
wage equation, but the estimates turned out very imprecise due to strong
collinearity between the two variables.  I had therefore to impose equality of the
wage elasticity with respect to the income tax and the employees' contribution rate
to social security, respectively.
In addition to these restrictions, I will also impose a long–run elasticity of wages
with respect to consumer prices of unity.  Of course, this restriction need not hold in
the short run, but it seems quite plausible in the long–run, and it is also supported
by statistical tests (see below).  Furthermore, these tests also show that price
increases are passed on to higher wages irrespective whether they originate from
higher producer costs or higher indirect taxes.  Finally, I assume that the
unemployment rate does not affect real wages in the long–run, but may have short–
run effects on wage setting behaviour, which is compatible with the insider–
outsider hypothesis (see, e.g., Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991).
Taking into account these restrictions the long–run wage equation which will be
estimated takes the following form, where small letters denote (natural) logs of the
corresponding variables and t is a time index:
(1) wr w pc tc t sw ti lpr tt t t t tt ≡− + = + ⋅ + ⋅ ++ ⋅ + () ( ) 1 01 11 21 31 1 ββ β β ε9
with wr real contract wage
w nominal contract wage
pc consumer price index exclusive indirect taxes
1+tc consumption tax rate
sw employees' social security contribution rate
ti income tax rate
lpr labour productivity
ε1t error term
βj1 parameters to be estimated (j=0,1,2,3).
The linear trend in the wage equation should account for structural change, such as
shifts between sectors, changes in union density and other factors not accounted for
by labour productivity. Labour productivity is defined as the ratio of real net
national income to the number of employees in the whole economy. In using net
national income instead of gross national product it is assumed here that unions
base their wage demands on what can actually be distributed in the economy.
Under certain conditions, which are discussed in section 3.2, a long–run
relationship as the wage equation (1) also implies (and is implied by) a dynamic
adjustment equation of the error–correction form (Engle and Granger, 1987) given
by
(2)      
                                    
∆∆ ∆∆ ∆ wr wr ti sw lpr U
ec
tt t t t t
tt




αα α α α
γη
01 11 1 21 31 41
11 1 1
()
where ∆ denotes the first–difference operator, η1 is a serially uncorrelated error
term, and the coefficients αj1 (j=0,1,2,3) are parameters to be estimated.  Additional
lags of the differenced variables may be included in the equation to purge remaining
serial correlation from the error term, where the number of lags will be decided on
by statistical criteria. The first difference of the unemployment rate is included in
the short–run wage equation to account for disequilibria in the labour market.  For
statistical reasons discussed below, the change in the unemployment rate and not its
level as in the traditional Phillips curve is included in the short–run wage equation.
The lagged ec1 term is defined by the error term from the long–run real wage, i.e.
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with the βji (j=0,1,2,3) corresponding to the parameters in equation (1) where a carat
("
∧") indicates an OLS estimate from this equation.10
The economic rationale for the inclusion of the error–correction term is that
temporary deviations of the real wage from its long–run equilibrium level will be
adjusted by the factor γ1 in each period until a new equilibrium is attained.  Hence,
this adjustment factor must be negative and significant.  The short–run (within a
year) impact of an explanatory variable on the real wage is given by the
corresponding coefficient αj1, whereas the long–run effect would be given by
αj1/(1–α11), which should be similar to the corresponding coefficient estimate from
the long–run wage equation.
3.1.2  Labour Demand Equation
The labour demand equation is derived under the assumption of imperfect
competition in the labour and the goods markets.  The implies that some demand
shift variable instead of the output price is included as explanatory variable.  Labour
costs are given by the real contract wage, that is the nominal wage deflated by the
GNP price deflator, plus employers' social security contributions. The effects of
technological change and capital on labour demand are simply proxied by a time
trend.  In addition, I tried to include a measure of the aggregate capital stock, but
this resulted in very imprecise estimates due to the extremely high collinearity
between these two variables.  I also included the ratio of export to import prices to
account for terms of trade effects, but this variable always turned out as completely
insignificant.
The long–run labour demand equation to be estimated is therefore of the following
simple form, where small letters again denote logs:
(4) lt w p s e y tt t t t =+⋅ +⋅ ++⋅ + ββ β β ε 02 12 22 32 2 1 ()
with l number of employees
wp real wage deflated by GNP price deflator ("product wage")
1+se employers' social security contribution rate
y real GNP
ε2t error term
βj2 parameters to be estimated (j=0,1,2,3).
The dynamic labour demand equation in error–correction form is given by
(5)      
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The interpretation of the error–correction term, the adjustment factor γ2 and the
coefficients  αj2 (j=0,1,2,3) is completely analoguous to that given for the wage
equation above.
3.2 Estimation
There are various ways to estimate the wage and employment equations derived in
the previous section.
4  One particularly simply procedure is the two–step estimator
suggested by Engle and Granger (1987) for cointegrated time series, which I will
also apply here.  However, since this estimator has some well–known potential
drawbacks, I have also applied other procedures, such as direct estimation of the
unrestricted error–correction equations of the dynamic wage and labour demand
equations by OLS and NLSQ, as well as the Johansen (1991) ML method.  Overall,
estimated (long–run) coefficients in the static models differ little between the
various estimation methods.  In contrast, estimated short–run coefficients from the
unrestricted error correction models are determined rather poorly due to the strong
correlation with the levels of the corresponding variables. In the following section,
only estimation results from the two–step estimator proposed by Engle and Granger
(1987), which in my opinion yields the most reliable estimation results for the wage
and labour demand models, will be reported.  However, where it seems appropriate
I will also refer to results from the other estimation procedures.
5
The two–step estimation procedure starts with tests of the order of integration of the
variables included in the static wage and labour demand equations.  Following usual
practice, I employ Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) tests to determine the order of
integration of these variables.  Having established the order of integration of all
variables, I estimate the static wage and labour demand equations by OLS and
calculate the error correction terms required for the second step of estimation.  I test
for cointegration between the variables in the two equations and also determine the
number of cointegrating vectors by the Maximum Likelihood method proposed by
Johansen (1991).  In a second step, I then estimate the dynamic wage and labour
demand equations with the error correction terms calculated from the first step
included.
                                          
4  For a detailed summary of estimation methods for non–stationary time series see, e.g., Banerjee
et al. (1993).
5  Detailed estimation results are available from the author on request.12
4 Results
4.1 Integration  Tests
Results from ADF tests summarized in Table 2 show that all variables included in
the wage and labour demand equations are integrated at least of order one, I(1).
Tests are performed both with and without a deterministic (linear) time trend, and
the number of lags of the differenced variables is determined by standard statistical
tests.
For the nominal wage and the consumer price index the ADF test indicates that
these variables are I(2), implying that their first differences are still non–stationary.
As the real wage is modelled here, this non–stationarity does not affect the
cointegration relationship between the variables in the wage and employment
equations.  The only other variable for which there is some indication that it may be
even I(2) is wp(1+se).  Since it plays a role in the dynamic wage equation, it should
be noted here that the unemployment rate, which is excluded from the static wage
equation on a priori grounds, is also I(1).
Table 2: ADF tests of order of integration of variables in the wage equation ( t–value  )
No deterministic time trend Linear time trend
Variable Level Difference Level Difference
w 1.78 2.45 .36 3.05
pc(1+tc) .86 2.74 1.55 2.74
wr 2.12 2.82 0.70 3.55
ti 1.57 4.93 1.24 5.19
lpr 2.66 3.20 1.36 4.16
l 0.64 4.59 3.11 4.50
wp(1+se) 1.69 2.15 0.95 2.66
y 1.73 4.30 2.23 4.69
U 0.97 3.82 3.34 3.75
Note: Critical values for the model with no deterministic time trend are –2.95 at the 5 % and –
3.65 at the 1 % significance level, respectively; for the model including a linear time trend these
values are –3.56 and –4.27, respectively.  The number of lags of the differenced variables to
account for serial correlation in the residuals is one in most cases and two at most for some of
the models in levels.13
4.2 Wage  Equations
Estimation of equation (1) by OLS yielded the following static wage equation:
(6) wr t sw ti lpr tt t t t =−⋅ +⋅ + +⋅ +
∧
2 571 0 002 0314 0 536 1 .. . ( ) . ε ,
adj. R
2 = 0.98, DW = 0.95, estimation period: 1960 – 1990 (n = 35),
where the coefficients on swt and tit were restricted to be equal in the estimation.
Due to the strong autocorrelation in the residuals from this first–stage regression,
estimated standard errors of coefficients are biased and not normally distributed.
Hence, they are not reported here. However, estimated coefficients would be
consistent even though potential dynamic misspecification and simultaneity
between variables in the model are ignored if they were in fact cointegrated.
6  A
standard ADF test on the residuals of the estimated static wage equation yielded a
value of –3.17 which is below (in absolute value) the tabulated critical 5 % value of
–3.82 (for n=50, constant, no trend, one lag) – see Banerjee et al. (1993, Table 7.1).
On the other hand, the likelihood–ratio test suggested by Johansen (1991) does
reject the hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5 % significance level.  Furthermore,
this test indicates that there is just one cointegrating vector in the system.
7 Hence,
taken together, it may be concluded that the variables in the wage model are in fact
cointegrated.
The point estimate of the coefficient on the income tax and employees' contribution
rate to social security seems much too high on a priori grounds, as it would imply
that real wages increase by more than one percent for each percentage increase in
either the income tax rate or the contribution rate.  On the other hand, the point
estimate for the elasticity of wages with respect to labour productivity of about .5
seems a bit low at first sight.  It also conflicts with the estimate by Carruth and
Schnabel (1993) and Tyrväinen (1995a) who have estimated an elasticity of one.
Some experimentation has shown that the estimated coefficient on the productivity
term is sensitive to the way the income tax and contribution rates enter the static
wage equation.  It should be noted that the cointegrating vector (normalized on the
real wage rate) estimated by the Johansen (1991) ML method in fact yielded a
somewhat higher coefficient on the productivity term and a lower coefficient on the
income tax contribution rate variables than the ones reported in equation 3 above.
However, given the relatively large and most likely downward–biased standard
errors in these static models, both estimates are probably not statistically different
from each other.
                                          
6  In fact, estimated long–run parameters would converge to their "true" values even at a faster rate
as OLS estimates under standard conditions.
7  These tests and all other estimation in this paper were performed using EVIEWS 2.0.14
More efficient parameter estimates may be expected from the second–step
estimation of the dynamic wage equation reported in Table 3, where the one–period
lagged residual from the first–step static wage equation is included as error–
correction term.  As it turned out, the inclusion of the lagged value of the dependent
variable and the differenced explanatory variables was sufficient to purge the
autocorrelation from the residuals in the dynamic wage equation.  With the
exception of the unemployment rate, for which the first difference turned out
insignificant whether or not its lagged value was included, estimated coefficients of
lagged differences of explanatory variables were also always insignificant.
Table 3: Dynamic real wage equation – OLS regression














Notes: The coefficients of ∆sw and ∆ti  were restricted to be equal in the estimation. The
Lagrange–Multiplier (LM) statistic tests for an AR(1) process in the residuals and has a χ
2
distribution with one degree of freedom; the crititical value at the 5% level is 3.84.
To start with the error–correction term, its coefficient is correctly signed and highly
significant.  This is to be expected if the variables in the long–run wage equation
are in fact cointegrated (Engle and Granger, 1987).  The value of the estimated
coefficient implies that about a third of the deviation from the long–run equilibrium
defined by the static wage equation is corrected within a year.  This value is almost
the same as the one estimated for Germany by Tyrväinen (1995a, p. 79) who, using
semi–annual data, reports a value of 0.15.
The other estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables in the dynamic wage
equation are also all correctly signed and highly significant.  Of primary interest
here is the coefficient on the change in the income tax and employees' contribution
rate, which implies a long–run elasiticity of real wages with respect to these15
variables of about .16 (=.079/(1–.491)).  This would mean that real wages in the
long–run increase by 1 percent when the income tax rate or the employees'
contribution rate is increased by one percentage point and would thus correspond to
the estimates by Tyrväinen (1995a) discussed in section 2.  Unfortunately, this does
not correspond to the point estimate in the static labour demand model.  Hence,
some doubts remain.
I have therefore also estimated the unrestricted form of the dynamic wage equation
using other standard estimation methods.  Instead of the residual from the first–
stage estimation the error–correction term enters the dynamic wage equation
unrestricted, i.e. in terms of the levels of the variables as in equation (4) above, and
the  βj1 coefficients are estimated along with the αj1 coefficients in one of two
alternative ways.  The most simple estimation method is by OLS with the βj1
coefficients recovered from the estimated ones which are compounded with the
adjustment coefficients, say βj1* = γ⋅βj1.  An alternative method is to estimate this
equation, which is non–linear in the βj1 parameters, by NLSQ.  The result of this
exercise is that, irrespective of the method used, both the short–run and the long–
run coefficients on the income tax and employees' contribution rate are almost
identical to the one estimated by the two–step method.  This shows that estimation
results are rather robust to the estimation method, but leaves the reason for the
divergence between the long–run wage elasiticity of the income tax and
contribution rate derived from, respectively, the static and dynamic wage equations
unexplained.
Another potential problem with the estimated coefficients in the dynamic wage
equation is simultaneity bias, especially with respect to the change in the income tax
and the contribution rate as well as labour productivity. I have therefore
instrumented these variables by their lagged values, contemporaneous and lagged
values of the other exogeneous variables in the model as well as the growth rates in
money supply and the government budget deficit.  However, estimation results
hardly differed between these IV estimates and those in Table 3 and are therefore
not reported here.
Judged by standard summary statistics the fit of the dynamic wage equation seems
reasonable, and there is no indication of dynamic misspecification.  Stability tests
(Cusum, Cusum squared, sequential Chow tests) also show that, with the possible
exception of one or two years, the estimated equation is stable over the whole
observation period. The performance of the model can also be gleaned from Figure
2 which plots the realisation, the estimate (ex post forcast) and the dynamic
simulation of the growth rate of wages.  The latter is started in 1970 and runs
through 1994.  Compared to an ex post forcast, the dynamic simulation is a harder
test of the estimated model, and it performs quite well.  Below, the dynamic
simulation will be used to perform some policy simulations.16























Note: Predicted and simulated growth rates are derived from the dynamic real wage equation in
Table 3; the dynamic simulation starts in 1970.
4.3  Labour Demand Equations
Estimation of equation (4) by OLS yielded the following static labour demand
equation:
(7) lt w p s e y tt t t t =+⋅ −⋅+ +⋅ +
∧
8937 0 001 0 230 1 0368 2 .. . ( ) . ε
    adj. R
2 = 0.95, DW = 0.54, estimation period: 1960 – 1990 (n = 35),
where the coefficients on wpt and (1+set) were restricted to be equal in the
estimation. For the reason given above, estimated standard errors of coefficients are
not reported here. The ADF cointegration test on the residuals of the estimated
static labour demand equation yielded a value of –5.03 which by far exceeds (in
absolute value) the tabulated critical 5 % value already referred to above.  Hence,
from this test it may concluded that variables in the wage model are in fact
cointegrated.  This conjecture is also supported by the Johansen test which rejects
the hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5 % significance level.  Furthermore, this
test indicates there is just one cointegrating vector in the system.17
The point estimate of the coefficient on the real wage and employers' contribution
rate to social security is –.23.  As to the real wage elasticity, this estimate is
somewhat higher than the one obtained by Flaig and Steiner (1989) using a similar
methodology, but quarterly data for West German manufacturing.  In contrast, it is
much lower than the value of –1 Tyrväinen (1995a) reports for Germany.  To me,
this latter estimate seems excessively large.  The estimated coefficient also implies
that labour demand decreases by .23 percent for each percentage increase in the
employers' contribution rate to social security, which seems reasonable.  On the
other hand, the point estimate for the elasticity of labour demand with respect to
real GNP seems quite low, both on a priori grounds and in comparison to other
estimates, e.g. those by Flaig and Steiner (1989) who report an elasticity of about
0.6.  A possible reason for this rather low elasiticity is that it refers to the whole
economy, whereas the Flaig and Steiner (1989) estimate refers to the manufacturing
sector only, where the wage responsiveness of labour is certainly higher.
Results from the second–step estimation of the dynamic labour demand equation are
reported in Table 4.  As in the wage equation, the inclusion of the lagged value of
the dependent variable and the differenced explanatory variables was sufficient to
purge the autocorrelation from the residuals in the dynamic wage equation.
Table 4: Dynamic labour demand equation – OLS regression












Notes: The coefficients of ∆wp and ∆(1+se) were restricted to be equal in the estimation. The
Lagrange–Multiplier (LM) statistic tests for an AR(1) process in the residuals and has a χ
2
distribution with one degree of freedom; the crititical value at the 5% level is 3.84.
As expected given the results from the first–stage estimation, the coefficient of the
error–correction term is correctly signed and highly significant. The value of the
estimated coefficient implies that about a third of the deviation from the long–run
equilibrium defined by the labour demand equation is corrected within a year.  This
corresponds to the estimate in the dynamic wage equation above.18
The other estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables in the dynamic labour
demand equation are also all correctly signed and highly signficant.  Of primary
interest here is the coefficient on the change in the real wage and the employers'
contribution rate, which implies a somewhat higher long–run elasiticity of real
wages with respect to these variables than obtained from the static labour demand
equation. The same also holds for the long–run elasticity of labour demand with
respect to output.
To probe the sensitivity of results to the estimation method used, I have also
estimated the unrestricted form of the dynamic labour demand equation by OLS and
NLSQ as above. However, these methods yielded insignificant short–run and long–
run coefficient estimates for most variables, in particular the real wage and the
employers' contribution rate.  The obvious reason for this result is the high
correlation between the first differences and the levels of these variables.  It should
be noted that the Johansen ML method also yielded very imprecise estimates of the
parameter in the static labour demand equation.  Hence, I will rely on the results
from the two–step estimation method and, since IV estimation produced quite
similar results, use the OLS estimates reported in Table 6 for the simulations below.
The fit of the dynamic labour demand equation seems reasonable, and there is no
indication of dynamic misspecification.  Stability tests (Cusum, Cusum squared,
sequential Chow tests) also show that, with the possible exception of one or two
years, the estimated equation is stable over the whole observation period. The
performance of the model can also be gleaned from Figure 3 which plots the
realisation, the estimate (ex post forcast) and the dynamic simulation of the growth
rate of labour demand.  Again, the dynamic simulation of the labour demand model
seems to perform reasonably well.19





















Note: Predicted and simulated growth rates are derived from the dynamic labour demand equation
in Table 4; the dynamic simulation starts in 1970.
5 Policy Simulations
In this section, the dynamic wage and labour demand equations are combined to
perform some policy simulations.  The main reason for not simply relying on the
estimated long–run elasiticities is that for economic policy making the short–run
effects of some policy change are usually at least as important as its long–run
impact.  A methodological reason relates to the fact that standard errors of
parameters from the static (long–run) wage and labour demand models are upward
biased.  In this context, the estimated wage elasticity with respect to the income tax
and the employees' contribution rate derived from the static wage equation poses a
special problem, as discussed above.  On the other hand, these effects seem much
better determined in the dynamic wage and labour demand equations.
As mentioned in the introduction, reducing social security contributions in order to
increase employment seems to have obtained high priority on the policy agenda in
Germany.  On the financing side, increasing direct and/or indirect taxes are
considered as policy options, for which there are basically two arguments.  The first
relates to a "broadening" of the financing base by bringing in new contributors.  The
second, and economically more interesting policy relies on the idea that labour costs
will be lowered by reducing employers' social security contributions.20
Figure 4: Simulation of the effects of a reduction of employers' social security contributions
by 20% (=3 percentage points) on real labour costs and employment
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Note: Simulations are based on the dynamic real wage and labour demand equations in Tables 3 -
4.21
Figure 5: Simulation of the effects of a reduction of employers' social security contributions
by 20% (=3 percentage points) on real labour costs and employment
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Note: Simulations are based on the dynamic real wage and labour demand equations in Tables 3 -
4.22
From this point of view, the hope is that the resulting positive employment effect
will exceed any potential negative effects from raising taxes to finance the cut in the
contribution rate.  Since higher direct taxes seem presently not to be on the policy
agenda, increasing indirect taxes, especially the value–added tax which is at a
relatively low level compared to most other EU member states, has recently become
a policy option in Germany.
The first simulation exercise refers to a reduction of the employers' contribution rate
to social security by 20 percent, which would reduce the contribution rate by about
3 percentage points, without raising taxes.  In the simulation, it is assumed that in
1980 the contribution rate would have been permanently reduced by 3 percentage
points.  The effect of this reduction on the growth rate of labour costs (=real wages
plus employers' social security contributions) and the level of employment within a
period of ten years is shown in Figure 4.
Compared to the baseline solution (historical contribution rates), the immediate
effect of this policy would have been a quite strong reduction in the growth rate of
real labour costs and an increase of employment by about 350 thousand persons in
the first year.  The effect of this reduction on the growth rate of real labour costs
virtually vanishes after the second year.  The maximum employment increase is
reached in the second year; it then declines continuously and eventually reaches a
stationary level of about 150 thousand persons after 6 – 7 years.
The second policy simulation refers to a reduction of the employers' rate to social
security by 3 percentage points financed by a revenue neutral increase in the value
added tax.  Since revenues from this source are approximately equal to employers'
social security contributions (DM 222.5 and 230.8 billions in 1994, respectively),
this would imply an increase in the value–added tax of roughly 3 percentage points
as well.  The effects of this revenue neutral shift of financing social security from
employers' contributions to value–added taxes on real labour costs and employment
are shown in Figure 5.
The immediate effect of this policy is to reduce real labour costs and to increase
employment.  However, after 3 – 4 years such a policy leads to higher growth rates
of labour costs for some years than under the historical policy regime.  In the long–
run, there seems to be no effect of this revenue neutral shift on the growth rates of
real labour costs.  Consequently, starting from a maximum employment increase of
about 220 thousand persons, the effect on employment decreases rapidly and
vanishes altogether after 5 – 6 years.The immediate effect of this policy is to reduce
real labour costs and to increase employment.  However, after 3 – 4 years such a
policy leads to higher growth rates of labour costs for some years than under the
historical policy regime.  In the long–run, there seems to be no effect of this revenue
neutral shift on the growth rates of real labour costs.  Consequently, starting from a23
maximum employment increase of about 220 thousand persons, the effect on
employment decreases rapidly and vanishes altogether after 5 – 6 years.
6 Conclusion
In view of the high level of unemployment in Germany and the looming problems
of financing the expensive German social security system there seems to be a
growing consensus that the reduction of the high contribution rates to social
security is a promising policy measures to reduce labour costs and increase
employment.  Such a view has recently also become popular among policy advisers,
such as the EU Commission and the OECD.
Following up recent econometric work on employment and wage effects of social
securtiy financing contained in the OECD Jobs Study, I find support for some of the
results for Germany.  In particular, my estimation results show that higher income
tax and employees' social security rates increase real wages at least proportionally
in the long–run.  Although my estimate of the long–run elasiticity of labour demand
with respect to real wages and employers' social security contributions is
considerably lower than the one reported in the OECD study, higher real labour
costs have strong negative employment effects. In the long–run, proportionate
increases of indirect taxes, the income tax, employees' and employers' contribution
rates all seem to raise real labour cost and reduce employment to the same extent.
A reduction of employers' as well as employees' contribution rates has substantial
positive employment effects even in the long-run if not compensated for by higher
taxes. On the other hand, the long–run effects of revenue neutral shifts of financing
social security from contribution rates to direct or indirect taxes will be small,
except they are accompanied by a broadening of the revenue base.  However, in the
short–run real wages and employment depend on the way social security is
financed, and there may therefore be some positive short–run employment effects
from revenue neutral shifts of financing social security.  Since this would also raise
social security contributions such a policy could be partially self–financing. These
indirect effects are not modelled here, but would have to be taken into account
before a final conclusion on the overall effects of changes in social security
financing can be drawn.24
Data Appendix
Symbol Variable Source
w Index of monthly contract wage, national economcy,
base year =  1991 (since 1986 including fringe
benefits, for details see Deutsche Bundesbank, 1994a)
DB (1975: 67*; 1980: 69*;
1992: 73*; 1994a: 33;
1994b: 83*; 1995: 67*), own
calculations
y
n Nominal gross national product SVR (1995: 390)
p
b Price deflator for gross national product, base year =
1991
SVR (1995: 462)
l Employees, concept = national accounts SVR (1995: 373)
u Unemployment rate SVR (1995: 369)
pc Consumer price deflator, including indirect taxes, all
private households, base year = 1991
SVR (1995: 460)
po Consumer price deflator, excluding indirect taxes, all
private households, base year = 1991; pc divided by
(1+ti), where ti is the indirect tax rate
SVR (1995: 390, 460), STABU
(1991: 65), STABU, BMF
(1995: 214–217), own
calculations (revenues from
excise and value–added taxes
1992–1994)
tc Indirect (consumption) tax rate: ratio of total revenues
from excise and value added to private consumption,
concept = national accounts
SVR (1995: 390), STABU
(1991: 65), STABU, BMF
(1995: 214–217), own estimate
(revenues from excise and
value–added taxes 1992–1994)
ti Income tax rate: ratio of total revenues from earnings
tax (wages and salaries) to total gross earnings of
dependently employed, concept = national accounts
STABU, SVR (1995: 388),
own calculations
se Employers' social security contribution rate: ratio of
social security contributions actually paid by
employers to total gross earnings, concept = national
accounts
STABU, SVR (1995: 388),
own calculations
sw Employees' social security contribution rate: ratio of
social security contributions actually paid by
employees to total gross earnings; social security
contributions are calculated as difference between
gross earnings and the sum of net earnings and
revenues from the earnings tax, concept = national
accounts
STABU, SVR (1995: 388),
own calculations
Notes:  DB = Deutsche Bundesbank, SVR = Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (German Council of Economic Advisers), STABU =
Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office), BMF = Bundesministerium der Finanzen
(Federal Finance Ministry); in case STABU is given as source without year and page number,
information was provided by phone.25
Sources:
Bundesministerium der Finanzen (Ed.) [1995]: Finanzbericht 1996, Die
volkswirtschaftlichen Grundlagen und die wichtigsten
finanzwirtschaftlichen Probleme des Bundeshaushaltsplans für das
Haushaltsjahr 1996, Bonn.
Deutsche Bundesbank (Ed.) [1975]: Monatsbericht, Vol.  27, No.  12, December
1975.
Deutsche Bundesbank (Ed.) [1980]: Monatsbericht, Vol. 32, No. 6, June 1980.
Deutsche Bundesbank (Ed.) [1992]: Monatsbericht, Vol. 44, No. 6, June 1992.
Deutsche Bundesbank [1994a]: „Zur Entwicklung der Tarif– und Effektivverdienste
seit Mitte der achtziger Jahre, Monatsbericht, Vol. 46, No. 8, August 1994.
Deutsche Bundesbank (Ed.) [1994b]: Monatsbericht, Vol.  46, No.  12, December
1994.
Deutsche Bundesbank (Ed.) [1995]: Monatsbericht, Vol.  47, No.  12, December
1995.
Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung
[1995]: Im Standortwettbewerb, Jahresgutachten 1995/96, November 1995,
Stuttgart.
Statistisches Bundesamt (Ed.) [1991]: Fachserie 18, Reihe S. 16, Der Staat in den
Volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnungen, October 1991, Stuttgart.
Statistisches Bundesamt (Ed.) [1995]: Statistisches Jahrbuch 1995  für die
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, September 1995, Wiesbaden.26
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